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ESTATE INVESTMENTS
By HUGH MCLEAN, of the Denver Bar

T

HIS rather expansive title needs definition and restric-

tion. It is perhaps needless to say that no attempt is
here made to give inside information (not possessed by
the author) on investment of estate funds at the good old
"6% with absolute safety," nor to present any patent
methods of keeping all beneficiaries happy with investments
which never default and never decline.
We must also exclude other large questions under current discussion, such as the problem whether a fiduciary is ever
justified (in the absence of specific directions or authority)
in buying common stocks as a hedge against inflation, or
otherwise engaging in the pursuit of that rather elusive willof-the-wisp, the purchasing power of the dollar.
The real topic is much narrower; it is merely to see
whether any lessons can be drawn from recent decisions on
investment questions. There is no doubt that the last few
years have been very hard on fiduciaries. Without, for the
most part, any fault of theirs, they have seen much of the
value of their estates swept away, income drastically reduced.
Beneficiaries, very humanly, have been looking for someone
to blame. Probate judges and surrogates have been confronted
with case after case of widows and orphans reduced to actual
want, until even the judges' nerves have become jittery. As
a result more cases have been brought into court raising questions of fiduciary investment responsibility, than in any like
period for many years. What lessons may be learned from
the decisions growing out of these troubled times? What
are the things a fiduciary (using that general term to include
executors, administrators, guardians and conservators) should
not do?
By way of preface it goes without saying that orders of
court should be secured authorizing sales and other acts
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regarding estate investments. It is not suggested that fiduciaries should assume to act without court order, or take the
responsibility of selling estate investments without court approval. But the initiative must come from the fiduciaryobviously it cannot come from the court; and most of the
trouble arises not from action but from neglect. The fiduciary
holds investments and does nothing until after the damage is
done. If he has sought, and the court has refused, an order
of sale, he will doubtless be excused if loss occurs.
1. The fiduciary should not delay to wind up his
decedent's speculations.
A margin account, retained by the executor for four
months after testator's death, caused great loss to the estate
in the 1929 crash. Held: Under the circumstances the delay
was not unreasonable and the executor was not liable.
Lazaar's Est. 247 N. Y. S. 230.
This probably pushes reasonable time to the limit. It is
doubtful if an executor would ordinarily need four months
to close up a clearly speculative transaction. The case at least
sounds a warning.
2. The fiduciary should not act, with respect to his
estates' investments, on incompetent advice, nor delegate his
responsibilities to others.
The trustee for an infant consulted his attorney for investment advice, and turned estate money over to the attorney,
who bought bonds technically legal but inferior in quality,
which later defaulted. The trustee made no investigation.
Held: The advice of counsel will protect a trustee on a question of law, but will not relieve him from exercising discretion
which belongs to the trustee alone. His improvidence and
supine negligence justify his surcharge and removal. Reiks
Estate 18 D. C. (Pa.) 252, March 10, 1933.
An executor converted U. S. bonds into personal notes
secured by second mortgages on real estate with a faulty title.
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He presented his lawyer's advice as an excuse. The court said:
"While the advice of a lawyer may repel the imputation
of malice and bad faith, it can furnish no other justification.
If the advice be wrong and the client follow it, his conduct is
as wrong as the advice. Lawyers are not privileged to advise
foolishly, and their clients are not protected by their foolish
advice. The court will look at the act and not at its adviser
in judging of its merit or demerit." Hanscom v. Marston, 82
Me. 288, 19 Atl. 460.
In one of the numerous cases involving the Macky
will, under which the University of Colorado was the chief
beneficiary, it appeared that the executor was appointed in
1907 and did not file his final report until 1920-something
of a record in itself. Meanwhile he had litigated to the Supreme Court and back, every possible question. Year after
year during this whole period he kept sums from $10,000 to
$13,000 lying idle in open account in the bank, without a
cent of interest to the estate. As one excuse he pleaded advice
of his attorney (who, it appeared, had used insulting language
to the Regents and threatened to "get them yet"). Held:
Advice of his attorney is no excuse. The executor will be surcharged for interest on the idle funds. Regents v. Wilson,
73 Col. 1.
Even a judge's advice, it seems, must be official to be
effective.
Judge Gabbert in Thomas Est., 26 Colo. 110, had before him the case of a conservator who received $4,500 cash
and kept it on hand seven years, making no investment. On
application to surcharge him on his final account, his excuse
was that the County Judge had told him it was his duty
to keep the funds on hand ready to turn over promptly if
his ward should be declared sane. Judge Gabbert, after saying
that a conservator is not to collect the funds for the purpose
of turning them over to those entitled to them, like an ad-
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ministrator, but to invest them in a safe and permanent
manner to produce an income so that the ward's principal
may not be unnecessarily depleted, has this to say about the
alleged advice of the judge:
"The advice * * * does not appear to have been given in pursuance of an application to the court. * * * It is not the duty of a
(judge) to advise parties to any action regarding their rights and duties
except when the matter is presented to him in his official capacity.
Mere advice or suggestions on his part regarding matters in which he
does not assume to act judicially, are no protection to those who choose
to rely upon them."

3. If a guardian, he should not make investments
maturing beyond his ward's majority.
A guardian made investments in mortgages which were
legal, but which matured three years after the minor attained
majority. Held: Investment improper, and objection of
minor on attaining majority sustained. "The law has been
settled for generations that the property of an infant should
not be impounded beyond his majority." Blakes Est. (N.
Y.), L. J. March 4, 1933-Perry, Trusts, Section 608.
How rigidly this principle would be enforced may be
open to question. But obviously a guardian, knowing his
minor will attain majority in 1937, should not invest his
funds in bonds maturing in 1955. Whether it is good for
him or not, the minor is apparently entitled to have his estate
practically in cash when it is turned over to him, just as is a
general legatee under a will. Compare the prohibition on a
guardian leasing his ward's real estate beyond his majority.
Colo. C. L. Sec. 5270.
4. If an executor or administrator, he should not lose
sight of his primary duty: To liquidate his estate, pay debts,
taxes and legacies, and pay or distribute the residue.
An executor retained the testator's stocks and other nonlegal investments for a period of three years, while they
steadily declined in value, until there was nothing left of the
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estate. Held: The executor was guilty of negligence. He
should have liquidated the assets and had the estate ready for
distribution a year after the grant of letters. He was, therefore, surcharged the value of the retained stocks as of one
year from the date of letters. Estate of Junkersfield, Westchester Law Journal, April 30, 1935.
Executors, qualifying in 1931, found that the estate
consisted of real estate and twelve mortgage participation
certificates. During the whole of the first year of administration and for some time after, the mortgage certificates could
have been liquidated at 90% of their face; but they were
retained in the estate until final accounting, at which time they
were practically worthless. On objection to the executors'
account. Held: Executors surcharged in an amount of 90%
of the face of the mortgage participations. "This estate should
have been ready for distribution, except as to the real estate,
within a year after the issuance of letters. The certificates
should have been and could have been liquidated." Estate of
Price, N. Y. L. J., April 8, 1935.
5. He should not hold decedent's speculative and nonlegal securities longer than a reasonable time.
This assumes a jurisdiction like Colorado where a
statute definitely prescribes what investments fiduciaries may
make. It is also subject to several qualifications or exceptions
noted later.
In a recent New York case it appeared that a testator died
leaving a will with general legacies, residue to son and daughter, named executors. The estate consisted almost entirely of
speculative railway and industrial stocks, actively traded on
the exchange. At inventory value, the estate would have paid
its claims, general legacies and a fair residue. The executors,
hoping that the stocks would rise and their residue be increased, held the stocks until when they filed their account,
there was not enough in the estate to pay the general legacies.
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Held: They will be surcharged in an amount sufficient to pay
general legacies in full. The court, brushing aside the excuses
of the executors, which were that they were waiting (1) for
the date for presentation of claims; and (2) the result of
a tax controversy in a foreign jurisdiction-says "The testimony of the testator's son makes it clear that he and his sister,
as residuary legatees, were seeking to recoup the shrinkage in
value of the shares purchased at higher prices by their father,
and that they were seeking to do this solely for their own
benefit, and (after the value in the residuary disappeared),
solely at the expense of the legatees. Happy would be the
speculator who could use other people's money for his margin,
and who could take all the profits if the speculation won, and
who could lay any loss of capital on the helpless furnisher
of money for the speculation. The trust which these executors took upon themselves was to administer the property
which they received. Caution would have dictated an order
to sell these shares immediately upon qualification. Nothing
whatever has been shown except this wholly improper motive
to benefit the executors as residuary legatees, why there was
any delay in the sale. They were not justified in holding
speculative securities merely because they could not make disposition of the cash realized therefrom. Whether they thought
the testator had other debts or not, their duty to liquidate
speculative common stocks was an urgent, immediate duty.
When that duty had been performed they could have invested in legal securities, if they chose, or have held the money
at interest. The courts have recognized and will continue to
recognize the unusual burden cast upon fiduciaries by the
unprecedented shrinkage in values beginning in the fall of
1929. The current depression, however, has not given an
immunity bath to unfaithful fiduciaries. Fiduciaries who
have honestly struggled with a difficult situation without
seeking personal gain at the expense of the trust will be given
the benefit of that consideration which should be extended
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to good faith and honest effort, and fair performance of the
fiduciary duty. The fundamentals of fiduciary duty remain
unchanged. Speculation is still forbidden, prompt liquidation
of speculative assets is still the settled rule." Matter of Stumpf
N. Y. Sur., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 8, 1934.
An administrator received as assets 50 shares of stock of
a private corporation. He made no effort to sell; the business
was continued and at the end of the administration year the
stock became worthless. Held: The administrator surcharged.
Lichians Est., N. Y. Sur., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 8, 1932.
The first excepticn to the rule requiring prompt sale of
non-legals might be stated thus:
Unless holding non-legals be expressly or im(A)
pliedly authorized by the will.
On this Perry says: "If a testator gives any directions
in his will to continue his investments already made, trustees
must of course follow such directions; and if they follow them
in good faith, they will not be liable for any losses, unless
they are negligent in failing to change an investment, when
it ought to be changed to save it, for it cannot be supposed
that the direction of a testator to continue a certain investment
relieves the trustees from the ordinary duty of watching such
investment, and of calling it in when there is imminent danger
of its loss by a change of circumstances.

*

*

* It is true

that a testator during his life may deal with his property according to his pleasure, and investments made by him are some
evidence that he had confidence in that class of investments;
but, in the absence of directions in the will, it is more reasonable to suppose that a testator intended that his trustees
should act according to law. Consequently, in states where
the investments which trustees may make are pointed out by
law, the fact that the testator has invested his property in
certain stocks, or loaned it on personal security, will not
authorize trustees to continue such investments (even though
requested to do so by the beneficiary) beyond a reasonable
time for conversion and investment in regular securities (and
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what is reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances
of each particular case). Taking all the cases together, it
would appear to be a settled principle that trustees are not
justified, in the absence of express or implied directions in the
will, in continuing an investment permanently, made by the
testator, which they would not be justified themselves in making." Perry on Trusts, Sec. 465.
(B)
Unless requested and indemnified by all the beneficiaries.
A testatrix bequeathed her residuary estate to seven persons, one of whom was named executrix. A large part of the
estate consisted of speculative stocks. Shortly after the testatrix's death three of the seven authorized the executrix to
use her own judgment as to holding the stocks. She delayed
settlement for three years, holding the stocks, which fell in
value. Held: She will be charged with the value as of the
date when her account should have been settled, namely, one
year after the date of letters. A consent of three does not
bind the others. Matter of Drake, 152 N. Y. Misc. 395.
(C)
Unless sale is impossible or obviously unwise.
In the following New York case, the Surrogate dismissed
objection to an executor's account for failure to sell the testator's stock in a close corporation. The court says: "It may
be conceded that it would have been the duty of the executor
to sell the stock if a reasonable market could have been found;
but there is no proof that any such market ever existed. This
is not surprising, since the purchase of a minority interest in
a close corporation is a transaction which would appeal to
few persons." Matter of Middleditch, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 18,
1935.
If one were to attempt, from this incomplete survey of
recent depression cases, to summarize the duty of the fiduciary
with respect to his estate investments, one might say:
He should not fail to meet the highest standards of fiduciary care and diligence, nor to seek court instruction in any
case of doubt.

